An overview of coherentism that can be useful when considering how theories of coherence might be used to flesh out the grasping condition on understanding. It is just dumb luck the genuine sheep happened to be in the field. Or, should we adopt a more relaxed view of what would be required to satisfy this conditionnamely, a view that focuses on the way the agent connects information. Argues that we should replace the main developed accounts of understanding with earlier accounts of scientific explanation. How should an account of objectual understanding incorporate these types of observationsnamely, where the falsity of a central belief or central beliefs appears compatible with the retention of some degree of understanding? ), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. ), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd Edition). ), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Grimm, S. Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2006): 515-535. Wilkenfeld (2013) offers the account that most clearly falls under Kelps characterization of manipulationist approaches to understanding. What (Good) is Historical Epistemology? | MPIWG . However, it is not entirely clear that extant views on understanding fall so squarely into these two camps. Here is one potential example to illustrate this point: consider that it is not clear that people who desire to understand chemistry generally care about the cause of chemistry. Kepler improved on Copernicus by contending that the Earths orbit is not circular, but elliptical. If Hills is right about this connection between grasping and possessing abilities, it might seem as though understanding-why is, at the end of the day, very similar to knowing-how (see, however, Sullivan 2017 for resistance to this suggestion).. Explores the pros and cons with at least 2 credible sources. For example, we might require that the agent make sense of X in a way that is reasonablefew would think that the psychic above is reasonable, though it is beyond the scope of the current discussion to stray into exploring accounts of reasonableness. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975. A potential worry then is that the achievement one attains when one understands chemistry need not involve the subject working the subject matterin this case, chemistryscause. For example, I can understand the quadratic formula without knowing, or caring, about who introduced it. What is curiosity? Secondly, even subject matters that traffic in empirical rather than abstract atemporal phenomena (for example, pure mathematics), are not clearly such that understanding them should involve any appreciation for their coming to be, or their being caused to exist. Given the extent to which grasping is highly associated with understanding and left substantively unspecified, it is perhaps unsurprising that the matter of how to articulate grasping-related conditions on understanding has proven to be rather divisive. Grimm has put his finger on an important commonality at issue in his argument from parity. Description Recall that epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge. 115, No. Pritchards assessment then of whether understanding is compatible with epistemic luck that is incompatible with knowledge depends on which kind of epistemic luck incompatible with knowledge one is discussing. In order to illustrate this point, Kvanvig invites us to imagine a case where an individual reads a book on the Comanche tribe, and she thereby acquires a belief set about the Comanche. Firstly, grasping is often used in such a way such that it is not clear whether it should be understood metaphorically or literally. and (ii) what qualifies a group of beliefs as a system in the sense that is at issue when it is claimed that understanding involves grasping relationships or connections within a system of beliefs? in barn faade cases, where environmental luck is incompatible with knowledge but compatible with cognitive achievement) and the absence of cognitive achievement in the presence of knowledge (e.g. This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. 4 Pages. View Shift in Epistemology.docx from SOCIOLOGY 1010 at Columbia Southern University. NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Khalifa, K. Understanding, Grasping and Luck. Episteme 10 (1) (2013b): 1-17. Understanding in Epistemology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Looks at the increasing dissatisfaction with ever-more complicated attempts to generate a theory of knowledge immune to counterexamples. Eds. Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. What is the grasping relation? ), Epistemic Value. Hills herself does not believe that understanding-why is some kind of propositional knowledge, but she points out that even if it is there is nonetheless good cause to think that understanding-why is very unlike ordinary propositional knowledge. Given that the result is the same (that is, the patients heart muscle blood supply is improved) regardless of whether he successfully completes the operation by luck or by skill, the instrumental value of the action is the same. Is it problematic to embrace, for example, a contextualist semantics for knowledge attributions while embracing, say, invariantism about understanding? In other words, one mistakenly take knowledge to be distinctively valuable only because knowledge often does have somethingcognitive achievementwhich is essential to understanding and which is finally valuable. We can acknowledge this simply by regarding Bs understanding as, even if only marginally, relatively impoverished, rather than by claiming, implausibly, that no understanding persists in such cases. Discuss the pros and cons of the epistemological shift in an essay Our culture is shifting, Dede argues, not just from valuing the opinions of experts to the participatory culture of YouTube or Facebook, but from understanding knowledge as fixed and linear to a . This paper proposes a revisionist view of epistemic value and an outline of different types of understanding. Examples of the sort considered suggest thateven if understanding has some important internalist component to ittransparency of the sort Zagzebski is suggesting when putting forward the KU claim, is an accidental property of only some cases of understanding and not essential to understanding. The Epistemology Shift: Embrace The Change - GradesFixer Drawing from Stanley and Williamson, she makes the distinction between knowing a proposition under a practical mode of presentation and knowing it under a theoretical mode of presentation. Stanley and Williamson admit that the former is especially tough to spell out (see Glick 2014 for a recent discussion), but it must surely involve having complex dispositions, and so it is perhaps possible to know some proposition under only one of these modes of presentation (that is, by lacking the relevant dispositions, or something else). Nonetheless, Zagzebski thinks that believing this actually allows us more understanding for most purposes than the vastly more complicated truth owing to our cognitive limitations. On such an interpretation, explanationism can be construed as offering a simple answer to the object question discussed above: the object of understanding-relevant grasping would, on this view, be explanations. He suggests that manipulating the system allows the understander to see the way in which the manipulation influences (or fails to influence) other parts of the system (2011: 11). But most knowledge is not metaknowledge, and epistemology is therefore a relatively insignificant source of knowledge. That said, for manipulationists who are not already inclined to accept the entailment from all-knowing to omni-understanding, the efficacy against the manipulationist is diffused as the example does not get off the ground. Consider, on this point, that a conspiracy theorist might very well grasp* the connection between (false) propositions so as to achieve a coherent, intelligible, though wildly off-base, picture. Hills thinks that moral understanding, if it were any kind of propositional knowledge at all, would be knowing a proposition under a practical mode and not necessarily under a theoretical mode.. Epistemology is the study of sources of knowledge. Lackey, J. Thirdly, and perhaps most interestingly, objectual understanding is attributed in sentences that take the form I understand X where X is or can be treated as a body of information or subject matter. epistemological shift pros and cons - erikapowers.com Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. In this Gettier-style case, she has good reason to believe her true beliefs, but the source of these beliefs (for example, the rumor mill) is highly unreliable and this makes her beliefs only luckily true, in the sense of intervening epistemic luck. The modern epistemology deals with the debate between rationalism and empiricism. The advances are clearly cognitive advances. Pritchard, meanwhile, claims that the matter of understandings compatibility with epistemic luck can be appreciated only against the background of a distinction between two kinds of epistemic luckintervening and environmentalboth of which are incompatible with knowledge. View Shift in Epistemology.edited.docx from SOCIOLOGY 1010 at Columbia Southern University. Discuss the pros and cons of the epistemological shift in an essay. Zagzebski does not mean to say that to understand X, one must also understand ones own understanding of X (as this threatens a psychologically implausible regress), but rather, that to understand X one must also understand that one understands X. A. and Gordon, E. C. Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support. Philosophia 39(4) (2011): 615-635. The surgeons successful bypass is valued differently when one is made aware that it was by luck that he picked an appropriate blood vessel for the bypass. For example, you read many of your books on screens and e-readers today. Longworth, G. Linguistic Understanding and Knowledge. Nous 42 (2008): 50-79. To defend the claim that possessing the kinds of abilities Hills draws attention to is not a matter of simply having extra items of knowledgeshe notes that one could have the extra items of knowledge and still lack the good judgment that allows you to form new, related true beliefs. There is a common and plausible intuition that understanding might be at least as epistemically valuable as knowledgeif not more soand relatedly that it demands more intellectual sophistication than other closely related epistemic states. But it is not strictly true. A useful taxonomising question is the following: how strong a link does understanding demand between the beliefs we have about a given subject matter and the propositions that are true of that subject matter? Putting this all together, a scientist who embraces the ideal gas law, as an idealization, would not necessarily have any relevant false beliefs. To borrow a case from Riggs, stealing an Olympic medal or otherwise cheating to attain it lacks the kind of value one associates with earning the medal, through ones own skill. The conspiracy theorist possesses something which one who grasps (rather than grasps*) a correct theory also possesses, and yet one who fails to grasp* even the conspiracy theory (for example, a would-be conspiracy theorist who has yet to form a coherent picture of how the false propositions fit together) lacks. When considering interesting features that might set understanding apart from propositional knowledge, the idea of grasping something is often mentioned. At the other end of the spectrum, we might consider an extremely strong view of understandings factivity, according to which understanding a subject matter requires that all of ones beliefs about the subject matter in question are true. That said, this article nonetheless attempts to outline a selection of topics that have generated the most discussion and highlights what is at issue in each case and what some of the available positions are. Carter, J. This type of a view is a revisionist theory of epistemic value (see, for example, Pritchard 2010), which suggests that one would be warranted in turning more attention to an epistemic state other than propositional knowledgespecifically, according to Pritchardunderstanding. For example, a self-proclaimed psychic might see someone trip and believe that he caused this persons fall. As it were, from the inside, these can be indistinguishable much as, from the first-person perspective, mere true belief and knowledge can be indistinguishable. Make sure you cite them appropriately within your paper, and list them in APA format on your Reference page. Explores the epistemological role of exemplification and aims to illuminate the relationship between understanding and scientific idealizations construed as fictions. But no one claims that science has as yet arrived at the truth about the motion of the planets. Considers some of the ramifications that active externalist approaches might have for epistemology. Working hypotheses and idealizations need not, on this line, be viewed as representative of realityidealizations can be taken as useful fictions, and working hypotheses are recognized as the most parsimonious theories on the table without thereby being dubbed as wholly accurate. For example, Hills (2009: 4) says you cannot understand why p if p is false (compare: S knows that p only if p). ), Knowledge, Virtue and Action. Resists Pritchards claim that there can be weak achievements, that is, ones that do not necessarily involve great effort. In short, then, Kvanvig wants to insist that the true beliefs that one attains in acquiring ones understanding can all be Gettiered, even though the Gettier-style luck which prevents these beliefs from qualifying as knowledge does not undermine the understanding this individual acquires. The group designated explanationists by Kelp (2015) share a general commitment to the idea that knowledge of explanations should play a key role in a theory of understanding (for example, Hempel 1965; Salmon 1989; Khalifa 2012; 2013). Finally, on the other side of the spectrum from Zagzebski and Kvanvig, and also in opposition with Pritchard, is the view that understandings immunity to epistemic luck is isomorphic to knowledges immunity to epistemic luck. A second variety of understanding that has generated interest amongst epistemologists is, understanding-why. It is worth considering how and in what way a plausible grasping condition on understanding should be held to something like a factivity or accuracy constraint. The following sections consider why understanding might have such additional value. In all these cases, epistemology seeks to understand one or another kind of cognitive success (or, correspondingly, cognitive failure ). Kvanvig 2003; Zagzebski 2001; Riggs 2003; Pritchard 2010), Grimms view is rooted in a view that comes from the philosophy of science and traces originally to Aristotle. This is a point Elgin is happy to grant. Includes Alstons view of curiosity, according to which the epistemic value of true belief and knowledge partially comes from a link to curiosity. Kelp points out that this type of view is not so restrictive as to deny understanding to, for example, novice students and young children. The cons of the epistemology shift that is a major - Course Hero For example, if I competently grasp the relevant coherence-making and explanatory relations between propositions about chemistry which I believe and which are true but which I believed on an improper basis. An overview of issues relating to epistemic value, including discussion of understanding as a higher epistemic state. Pritchard (2007) has put forward some ideas that may prevent the need to adopt a weak view of understandings factivity while nonetheless maintaining the key thrust of Elgins insight. Carter, J. The epistemological shift in the present In the study of epistemology, philosophers are concerned with the epistemological shift. This entry surveys the varieties of cognitive success, and some recent efforts to understand some of those varieties. That is, we often describe an individual as having a better understanding of a subject matter than some other person, perhaps when choosing whom to approach for advice or when looking for someone to teach us about a subject. Strevens (2013) focuses on scientific understanding in his discussion of grasping. This is of course an unpalatable result, as we regularly attribute understanding in the presence of not just one, but often many, false beliefs. epistemological shift pros and cons. Achievements, unlike mere successes, are regarded as valuable for their own sake, mainly because of the way in which these special sorts of successes come to be. In the study of epistemology, philosophers are concerned with the epistemological shift. PHIL 201 AIU Philosophy Pros & Cons of The Epistemological Shift Essay An earlier paper defending the intellectualist view of know-how. This is because Stella lacks beliefs on the matter, even though the students can gain understanding from her. Stanley, J. However, it is less clear at least initially that retreating from causal dependence to more general dependence will be of use in the kinds of objectual understanding cases noted above. Outlines a view on which understanding something requires making reasonable sense of it. The Pros And Cons Of Epistemology. Toon, A. Kvanvig (2003; 2009) offers such a view, according to which understanding of some subject matter is incompatible with false central beliefs about the subject matter. Thirdly, even if one accepts something like a moderate factivity requirement on objectual understandingand thus demand of at least a certain class of beliefs one has of a subject matter that they be trueone can also ask further and more nuanced questions about the epistemic status of these true beliefs. Baker, L. R. Third Person Understanding in A. Sanford (ed. Toon (2015) has recently suggested, with reference to the hypothesis of extended cognition, that understanding can be located partly outside the head. This is perhaps partially because there is a tendency to hold a persons potential understanding to standards of objective appropriateness as well as subjective appropriateness. In looking at moral understanding-why, outlines some key abilities that may be necessary to the grasping component of understanding. Gives an overview of recent arguments for revisionist theories of epistemic value that suggest understanding is more valuable than knowledge. epistemological shift - porosity.ca Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Defends the strong claim that propositional knowledge is necessary and sufficient for understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. For example, when the issue is understanding mathematics, as opposed to understanding why 22=4, it is perhaps less obvious that dependence has a central role to play. Contains a discussion of the fact that we often take ourselves to understand things we do not. He argues that what is grasped or seen when one attains a priori knowledge is not a proposition but a certain modal relationship between properties, objects or identities. Grimm (2006) and Pritchard (2010) counter that many of the most desirable instances of potential understanding, such as when we understand another persons psychology or understand how the world works, are not transparent. A monograph that explores the nature and value of achievements in great depth. An important question is whether there are philosophical considerations beyond simply intuition to adjudicate in a principled way why we should think about unifying understanding cases in one way rather than the other. Relation question: What is the grasping relationship? However, if understanding-why actually is a type of knowing how then this means that intellectualist arguments to the effect that knowing how is a kind of propositional knowledge might apply, mutatis mutandis, to understanding-why as well (see Carter and Pritchard 2013). He suggests that the primary object of a priori knowledge is the modal reality itself that is grasped by the mind and that on this basis we go on to assent to the proposition that describes these relationships. sustainability scholarship 2021; lost vape centaurus replacement panels; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Includes further discussion of the role of acceptance and belief in her view of understanding. This type of understanding is ascribed in sentences that take the form I understand why X (for example, I understand why the house burnt down). Utilize at least 2 credible sources to support your position presented in the paper. However, Pritchards work on epistemic luck (for example, 2005) and how it is incompatible with knowledge leads him to reason that understanding is immune to some but not all forms of malignant luck (that is, luck which is incompatible with knowledge). In terms of parallels with the understanding debate, it is important to note that the knowledge of causes formula is not limited to the traditional propositional reading. Kelp (2015) makes a helpful distinction between two broad camps here. Uses the hypothesis of extended cognition to argue that understanding can be located (at least partly) outside the head. He gives the name grasping* to the purely psychological component that would continue to be satisfied even if, say, an evil demon made it the case at the moment of your grasping that there was only an appearance of the thing that appears to you to be the case. Such cases she claims feature intervening luck that is compatible with understanding. Argues against compatibility between understanding and epistemic luck. Grimm, S. Understanding as Knowledge of Causes in A. Fairweather (ed. In addition, it is important to make explicit differences in terminology that can sometimes confuse discussions of some types of understanding. reptarium brian barczyk; new milford high school principal; salisbury university apparel store Secondly, there is plenty of scope for understanding to play a more significant role in social epistemology. Argues that a type of understanding might be the norm that warrants assertion in a restricted class of cases. In this sense, the history of thought can be seen as the sometimes imperceptibly fluid, sometimes bizarre and abrupt, movements of our concepts. Proposes an account of understandings value that is related to its connection with curiosity. Hence, he argues that any propositional knowledge is derivative. A worry about this move can be put abstractly: consider that if understanding entails true beliefs of form , and that beliefs of form
must themselves be the result of exercising reliable cognitive abilities, it might still be that ones reliable
-generating abilities are exercised in a bad environment. Her main supporting example is of understanding the rate at which objects in a vacuum fall toward the earth (that is, 32 feet per second), a belief that ignores the gravitational attraction of everything except the earth and so is therefore not true. Grimm develops this original position via parity of reasoning, taking as a starting point that the debate about a priori knowledge, for example, knowledge of necessary truths, makes use of metaphors of grasping and seeing that are akin to the ones in the understanding debate. In addition, Zagzebski supports the provocative line that understanding can perhaps sometimes be more desirable when the epistemic agent does not have the relevant true beliefs. If this is right, then at least one prominent case used to illustrate a luck-based difference between knowledge and understanding does not hold up to scrutiny. A second reason that adverting to grasping-talk in the service of characterizing understanding raises further question is that it is often not clarified just what relationships or connections are being grasped, when they are grasped in a way that is distinctive of understanding.
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